Water and the Cities of the Southwest by Folk-Williams, John A. & University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Books, Reports, and Studies Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the Environment 
1990 
Water and the Cities of the Southwest 
John A. Folk-Williams 
University of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/books_reports_studies 
 Part of the Water Law Commons, and the Water Resource Management Commons 
Citation Information 






JOHN A. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WATER AND THE CITIES OF THE 
SOUTHWEST (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. 
of Law 1990). 
 
Reproduced with permission of the Getches-Wilkinson 
Center for Natural Resources, Energy, and the 
Environment (formerly the Natural Resources Law 
Center) at the University of Colorado Law School. 
 




Santa Fe, New Mexico
Western Water Policy Project
Discussion Series No. 3
NRLC Discussion Paper Series
Natural Resources Law Center
January 1990
PREFACE
In 1988 the Natural Resources Law Center initiated the Western Water Policy
Project with the support of a grant by the Ford Foundation. This project includes a
broad-ranging review of the laws, policies, and institutions governing the alloca
tion and use of water resources in the western United States. It is aimed at ad
dressing the adequacy of western water policy to respond to the needs of the con
temporary West.
A major objective of the Western Water Policy Project is to encourage
discussion of water policy issues. To further this objective we are initiating this
Discussion Paper series. The papers in this series are written in conjunction with
periodic workshops primarily involving a water policy working group. The
members of this group are F. Lee Brown, James E. Butcher, Michael Clinton,
Harrison C. Dunning, John Echohawk, Kenneth Frederick, David H. Getches,
Helen Ingram, Edwin H. Marston, Steven J. Shupe, John E. Thorson, Gilbert
White, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Zach Willey.
We welcome comments and responses to these papers.
Larry MacDonnell
© 1991
Natural Resources Law Center
University of Colorado School of Law
University of Colorado at Boulder
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Water and the Cities
of the Southwest
John A. Folk-Williams*
Since the demise of the energy development plans of the 1970s, cities have
held center stage in the southwestern quadrant of the country as the chief source
of demand for water. While agriculture has been struggling to hold its own, ur
ban areas have continued steady growth, though at slower rates in the late 1980s
than in earlier decades. Reflecting their growing political and economic power,
cities have been developing new policies and institutions that not only control
water but also plan for its future use. In fact, cities have taken a leadership role in
water planning, looking 40 to 100 years ahead. They have taken prominent roles
in conservation and recycling, new project construction, water marketing and
changes in state water policy and law.1 Because of their growth and long planning
horizons, cities are one of the dynamic forces for change throughout the region,
but they are also perceived as hostile or indifferent to the values of other con
stituencies. As builders of water projects, they have been accused of causing major
environmental disruptions. As sponsors of legislation to change water law, they
have been accused of undermining long established property rights. Rural Indian
and Hispanic communities have charged them with discrimination, and many
rural counties to which cities have come for new water supplies have accused
them of stealing local resources. As a major agent of change regarding access to
water, they are bound to be controversial. This paper examines several specific
cases in which urban water interests have clashed with rural communities or
with state and national public interests and will try to sketch the context in which
new policy approaches might be developed.
THE VARIETIES OF URBAN WATER CONDITIONS
IN THE ARID WEST
The cities of the West share a common purpose in their attitude toward water,
but there are many elements which differentiate urban regions from one another.
Their common purpose may be exemplified in a quotation from a strategy docu
ment prepared by the City of Albuquerque, which succinctly expresses the basic
orientation of urban water departments:
Partner, Western Network, Santa Fe, New Mexico.
J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, S. FRY& L HILCENDORF, WESTERN WATER FLOWS TO THE CnTES (1985).
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The City of Albuquerque has accepted the responsibility for supplying—in perpetuity—clean,
potable water to its citizens, as well as to some people in nearby areas.
Therefore, the Public Works Department, as the City's agent, must insure that:
1. An adequate supply of water exists and will exist FOREVER (sic) to satisfy this obligation,
and
2. The City has the legal right to use that water.
The City has a corollary responsibility: It must insure that neither pollution nor competitive
users will diminish the Department's capacity to deliver adequate amounts of clean, potable water.2
Every urban water manager would probably agree with this statement of the
weighty responsibility he or she bears. The assumption here is that, whatever the
level of growth, water must be provided permanently. This means that water
managers are constantly looking at the limits of their supply and searching for
ways to expand it and protect it.
Most observers of the water situation of the arid West have said that water is
the single most important factor limiting the growth of the region. One could ar
gue that the fundamental purpose of urban water management is to ensure that
water is never a limit on growth. For the most part, still benefiting from a na
tional trend toward migration to the sun and from immigration from Latin
American and Asian countries, the growing cities of the Southwest compete
fiercely for larger shares of the jobs and industries the national economy contin
ues to produce. The Los Angeles area, beset with pollution and quality of life
problems, may have reached certain limits (stories are multiplying about escape
routes from southern California to less crowded and less expensive regions—Los
Angeles itself is growing now only because of immigration from foreign coun
tries), but the economies of these urban regions as a whole continue to attract sub
stantial new business investments and will do so for some time to come.3
The urban areas of the arid West that have experienced rapid growth in the
past decade (we will not deal here with the smaller cities tied closely to the ups
and downs of a single industry), present three aspects for examination. First, they
vary in the complexity of political subdivisions into which they are divided.
Tucson and Albuquerque are the sole large municipal entities within their re
gions while the Denver, Phoenix and Los Angeles areas have many municipal
entities with well developed water resource capabilities. This political waterscape
does not alter the fundamental task of urban water policy makers, but it does de
termine the institutional framework responding to water needs.
Second, these urban areas differ with respect to their present water supply pic
ture. Some, like Los Angeles and Albuquerque, have surpluses of water because
Public Works Department, City of Albuquerque, Water Resource Management Strategy 4 (1987).
3 G. NASH, THEAMERICAN WEST IN THETWENTIETH CENTURY 5 and 90-93 (1973).
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of early plans to secure both local and remote supplies. Others, like Reno and El
Paso, are pushing the limits of the locally available supplies right now and have
no foreseeable hope of large scale water importation projects to solve their prob
lems. In between are the Phoenix area municipalities, the Salt Lake City area and
Denver where a combination of local acquisitions and importation have created
an adequate supply but where the search continues to meet needs over long term
planning horizons.
Third, these areas differ as to the state legal regimes under which water plan
ning and acquisition take place. Arizona laws requiring demonstration of a 100
year assured supply, coupled with progressive conservation requirements aimed
at achieving safe yield in groundwater pumping, have spurred cities and devel
opers into a water market in rural areas remote from the Phoenix valley. New
Mexico has limited future water planning to a 40 year horizon, and the State
Engineer has denied, on at least two occasions, water permit applications based on
projections beyond this planning period. On the other hand, a county ordinance
in Colorado requires a 300 year assured supply. The procedures under which
states review decisions about the transfer of water to urban use differ markedly,
and laws regulating groundwater range from the absolute ownership concept in
Texas to the rigorous state supervision of the Arizona Groundwater Management
Act. San Antonio is struggling to achieve agreement on groundwater use with
rural interests in the absence of a state regulatory power over the resource.
Albuquerque, on the other hand, is required regularly under state law to retire
surface rights to compensate for groundwater pumping.
URBAN DECISIONS AND RURAL IMPACTS:
THE ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Despite the very real differences in the situations facing these cities, all of
them have a similar problem. They are the major water users projecting signifi
cant growth in supply in the region. Each of them is displacing local agriculture to
some extent as water moves into municipal uses. Despite the fact that a few have
plenty of water now, the length of their planning horizons means that they are
constantly considering the limits of supply and must plan to meet high rates of
growth still projected for them through the next century.
These urban areas draw resources to themselves. Creating markets for jobs and
services, physically expanding and redefining their boundaries and service areas,
the cities are a dynamic force throughout the region. They tend to concentrate
population, resources and economic opportunity in a way that has overshadowed
other sectors in the southwestern states. The Council of State Governments has
pointed out that the urbanized proportion of the population in the West
(approximately 84 percent) is exceeded only by the industrial Northeast. As the
major urban regions gain control over larger and larger shares of the water sup-
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plies to meet their needs, they pose critical policy questions of fundamental eq
uity.
How will the rural interests, whether close to the urban areas or hundreds of
miles distant, affected by the search for water participate in decision making that
so closely affects them? Most of the urban water institutions are either utilities or
management entities accountable only to a city council or to an electorate of
sharply limited geographical extent. Yet their policies and roles are transforming
them into regional entities of significant power. Los Angeles is still dealing with
the impacts of its Owens Valley water system, long after the original battles of the
early part of this century.4 Phoenix and its neighboring municipalities have en
countered similar if less dramatic antagonism from rural counties from which
they want to draw groundwater. Scottsdale is at the center of a water allocation
controversy about the Bill Williams River. Aurora has developed land reclama
tion policies for the Arkansas Valley. Reno is seen as a threat to rural California
counties as well as to a downstream Indian tribe.
Urban water management institutions are various in their organization and
the nature of their accountability. The Metropolitan Water District of Southern
California is a water wholesaler which provides water to 27 member agencies,
each of which is itself a water provider to an urban population in the region. The
entitlement to MWD water is dependent on the cumulative taxes paid, rather
than population, resulting in inadequate entitlements for younger and smaller
agencies in rapidly growing areas. The organizational accountability of MWD is
principally to its member agencies, though many of its water acquisition pro
grams are constrained by state laws and the politics of other constituencies con
cerned about the potential impacts of MWD activities on their access to water and
other benefits.
At the opposite extreme, organizationally, from MWD are the private water
companies that supply the cities of Reno and Santa Fe. In these two cases, the
companies have a primary responsibility to their stockholders which is condi
tioned by the terms of franchise agreements with the cities. City and regional
planning entities have attempted, with varying success, to control water acquisi
tion and distribution policy. The state agencies that represent the broadest public
interest in these cases are the public service commissions, which set rates and
other major policies for the private urban water providers. Their traditional pur
pose is to balance the needs of stockholders and those of ratepayers.
The most common organizational form of the urban water providers is the
city water department, which is accountable to a city council. Some, like the
4 W. KAHRL, WATER AND POWER 446-51 (1982).
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Denver Water Board, have independent powers and considerable authority to act
outside the consideration of the council but their governing directors are still ap
pointed by an elected official.
Perhaps the most broadly representative of existing urban water provider or
ganizations is one that actually has a much broader mission, the Central Arizona
Water Conservancy District. Its board is elected from the three counties in which
Central Arizona Project (CAP) waters are delivered, but the two urban counties
have the majority of the elected seats. Much of the purpose of the CAP has shifted
from agriculture to urban needs in the past twenty years.
The common theme of these organizational forms is their accountability, in
varying degrees, to a primarily or exclusively urban population, i.e. the con
sumers of water delivered by these agencies. So long as these providers have no
other direct institutional accountability, or none other with so strong an ability to
determine the basic mission and policies of the organization, then these
providers will carry out the job assigned them, to ensure uninterrupted urban
water supplies as far into the future as possible. The willingness of these agencies
and their constituents to define policies taking broad state interests into account
or the specific interests of non-urban constituencies affected by their decisions will
only exist to the extent that there is a coincidence of self-interest
If the cities fail in their basic mission, the economic and political consequences
for their urban constituents can be severe indeed. The City of Phoenix estimated
in its water plan that a 50 percent cutback in water supplies would cost the indus
trial sector of the local economy more than $5.5 million per week and would cost
the non-manufacturing sector about $21 million per week.5 Consumers would be
forced to cut back on consumption as well, and elected officials, as well as water
managers, would be quickly condemned for having failed in their basic job. Their
accountability is found within their service area.
State policies, of course, are established principally by legislatures, and the
trend in legislative representation follows the concentration of population in the
arid Southwest into urban areas. The cities, then, are increasing their ability to de
fine state policies in ways that will further their interests. But legislatures still
represent rural and other constituencies as well so that cities do not have a free
hand. They must respond politically to the needs of other communities as well as
to a larger public interest. At present, legislatures offer the principal forum in
which urban needs can be balanced by others in the definition of policies. They
are the principal check on the considerable economic and political power of the
urbanizing regions, but with each new reapportionment that balance shifts a bit
more to the advantage of the cities.
5 Water and Wastewater Department, City of Phoenix, Must the Roses Die? A Summary of the Phoenix Water Resources Plan
-1987, at 20 (1987).
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The question becomes: Is it desirable and/or feasible to attempt to create more
broadly representative institutional structures to which urban water agencies
would have some degree of accountability. To illustrate the issues involved in
this question, we will briefly examine a few efforts underway in Colorado,
Arizona, Nevada and California to deal with the consequences of urban decision
making about water that conflicts with rural and public interests.
SCENES FROM THE URBAN-RURAL CONFRONTATION
These cases arise in situations where very different tools exist for rural con
stituencies to have an impact on urban decisions. These include: 1) Arizona—
where rural counties have been seeking the creation of a regulatory system that
would give them a voice in water purchases within their boundaries for exporta
tion to the greater Phoenix metropolitan area; 2) Colorado—where rural counties,
possessing a limited permitting system that can control the impacts of urban wa
ter projects, must now fight a court battle in which Denver is contesting the appli
cability of that system to its plans; 3) California—where the state environmental
statutes have provided a basis for litigation that has enabled a rural county to ne
gotiate a settlement with Los Angeles; and 4) Nevada—where federal law has
provided an elaborate set of tools enabling an Indian government to reach a nego
tiated settlement involving Reno.
ARIZONA
In recent years, the cities of Phoenix, Scottsdale, Glendale and Mesa have ac
tively pursued a strategy of meeting projected future shortfalls in water supply by
buying water "farms" at remote locations.6 These "farms", that is, ranch and farm
lands whose value to the cities consists of their associated water rights, are located
in rural counties where the full impact of the Arizona Groundwater
Management Act of 1980 is not felt. Under that act, the cities of the Phoenix
Active Management Area must meet goals for reducing per capita water use in
order to help achieve the statutory goal of groundwater withdrawals equalling
recharge by 2025, and they must demonstrate the availability of a 100 year assured
water supply. All these cities will rely on Central Arizona Project surface water to
supplant local groundwater pumping, but the act does not prevent them from
pumping groundwater outside the AMA either for direct importation for future
use or for exchange for additional CAP water. Thus, the cities have spent millions
of dollars for water farms but have also provoked the rural counties where these
purchases have been made.
In particular, La Paz County in western Arizona, where only ten percent of the
land within its boundaries is in private ownership, has protested that the sale of a
6 Woodard, Cheechio, Thacker & Colby, The Water Transfer Process in Arizona: Anaylsis of Impacts and Legislative Options,
University of Arizona, Division of Economic and Business Research, Department of Public Administration 29 (April 1988).
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significant fraction of that private land to municipalities will dangerously erode
its already small tax base. Further, the county argues that exporting groundwater
from this desert region will jeopardize the future economic growth of the area. La
Paz has been joined in articulating this point of view by Yuma and Mohave coun
ties, its neighbors on the south and north, respectively, where urban purchases of
ground and surface water have also been considered.
Over the past two years, the urban and rural interests have attempted to nego
tiate a bill that would provide a comprehensive solution to this problem. Under
present law, the rural counties have no voice whatsoever. Groundwater law out
side the management areas prescribed by the Groundwater Management Act al
lows the surface owner to extract as much water as he or she pleases so long as it
is put to beneficial use. There is neither a state nor a local permitting process that
deals directly with the transfer of water farms or the exportation of water. The leg
islature did authorize a voluntary payment in lieu of taxes program which creates
the possibility that cities can compensate rural counties for the loss of tax rev
enues deriving from municipal ownership of private land, but this is all that cur
rent law offers the counties.
Rural advocates proposed a number of water transport permitting systems,
ranging from county approval to a state system, but the cities rejected direct regu
lation of this sort. The negotiations came to focus on a complex bill7 that would
have closed all but a few groundwater basins to water export and would have
permitted pumping only to certain depths in order to conserve a minimal supply
for the future. It also would have kept the voluntary in lieu tax payment system
but would have made such payments a prerequisite to transporting water out of
the county. The bill became encumbered with special interest elements, including
special treatment for private speculators who had already invested in water farms
and creation of a new commission to look into instream flow protection for the
entire state. The bill passed the Arizona House but died in the Senate.
Importantly, the final bill was rejected by the rural counties, and it was their
opposition that managed to tie it up in the Senate. While this demonstrates that
the state legislature is a forum where interests still must be balanced, the failure
of any bill to pass means that the rural counties are left without any further pro
tection. In the last days of the legislative session a new idea surfaced which might
yet provide the solution that both sides can live with. This is the concept of turn
ing over the whole problem of meeting urban water supply needs to either a state
or regional water acquisition agency. Such an agency would eliminate the need
for cities to enter the market place themselves, often in competition with each
other, but might also provide a level of public accountability beyond the bound
aries of the urban area for the purchasing process itself. This concept will likely
provide the framework for debate over the next year or two as rural and urban in
terests search for some way to meet their basic needs.8
7 House Bill 2666,39th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., Arizona (1989) (known as the Groundwater Transportation Act of 1989).
8 Southern Arizona Water Resources Association, Comparison of Augmentation Agency Proposals (1990).
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COLORADO
In Colorado there are two ways in which cities have been planning to meet fu
ture water needs by importation from rural counties. One is by constructing new
water storage facilities in those rural locations. Denver, Aurora and Colorado
Springs have projects planned for locations on both sides of the Continental
Divide. A state land use planning law passed in the 1970s and known as the 1041
regulations allows counties to adopt permitting processes for new water facilities
within their boundaries. Thus the counties have a direct method for influencing
project construction. Denver, however, challenged the applicability of such regu
lations to its activities and argued its case before the Colorado Supreme Court,
having lost earlier decisions at the district and appellate levels. One county advo
cate has described the value of the 1041 regulatory system as follows:
Transmountain diversions cannot and should not be stopped through local regulations, but many
of the concerns of the basin of origin can be addressed through the 1041 process. The 1041 regulations
accomplish this goal by initially requiring impacts to resources and activities be identified in the
permit application process. The locally affected jurisdiction and the project proponent can then
negotiate exchanges, releases, compensatory storage, or other mitigation plans rather than deferring
to legislative mandates or court imposed solutions. A reasonable exercise of local land use authority
over the method and manner of diversion can actually result in far better communication between
East and West Slope water users and a greater understanding that development of the Front Range
and protection of headwater resources represents a symbiotic relationship.9
The 1041 approach represents only a limited tool for participation in urban wa
ter decisions because it does not allow for a rural voice in the city planning pro
cess and simply positions the county of origin to react to plans for transbasin di
versions. Its greater value is precisely that identified in this quotation, that it em
powers the county to an extent that will make it possible for an agreement to be
reached meeting its concerns while also allowing transbasin diversions to occur.
A somewhat similar situation exists through a very different process with respect
to transfers of water rights, which is the second method cities are using to meet
future needs.
The purchase of agricultural water rights and subsequent transfer of use and
point of diversion to enable the water to be used, either through direct transporta
tion or exchange, in a different basin for urban purposes is a process that is under
state rather than county jurisdiction. The water courts provide standing to af
fected rights holders to protest such transfers, and negotiated agreements have
been worked out to provide some relief for the third party impacts in certain ar
eas. Colorado law, however, does not have transfer criteria relating to the public
interest, and it is up to individual water user entities to bear the brunt of filing
9 Green, 2041: The Local Perspective, presented at the 1986 Colorado Bar Association Convention, Joint Program of the
Environmental Law and Water Law Sections, at 12-13 (1986).
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protests. In the Arkansas Valley, Aurora has negotiated mitigation agreements to
compensate local water users for the impact of transferring substantial water
rights outside of the basin.10 In a case involving the Rocky Ford ditch, Aurora
agreed to meet costs of operation and environmental impact mitigation to protect
the interests of downstream water users and also agreed to storage provisions that
met the needs of upstream water users. But the costs of the litigation that
prompted a negotiated settlement were high, and only those issues were raised
that were asserted. Local municipal and county governments, for example, did
not assert objections relating to impact on the tax base or governmental opera
tions.
CALIFORNIA
The California case presents the most recent episode in the decades-long strug
gle between Los Angeles and the Owens Valley and Mono Lake regions. The de
fense of Mono Lake in California courts has, of course, resulted in the application
of the public trust doctrine as a means of limiting the impact of Los Angeles water
rights on a major public resource, Mono Lake. Of equal interest, however, has
been a series of negotiations over the last decade between Inyo County, in which
the greater part of the Owens Valley lies, and the Los Angeles Department of
Water and Power.
Inyo County took the lead as the public entity protesting the impacts of
groundwater pumping by LADWP on environmental and water supply condi
tions in the valley. Using the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as its
key tool, Inyo County launched a series of lawsuits in the 1970s and 80s to block
Los Angeles' pumping activities. It was primarily concerned about destruction of
vegetation, as pumping removed groundwater on which plant communities de
pended, and the resulting increase in soil erosion and airborne dust as erodible
desert soils were exposed to the wind after removal of vegetative cover. Springs,
seeps and artesian wells were also dried up by the city's pumping, it was alleged.
An interim agreement in 1984 regulated the pumping rates the city could use, and
this was superseded by a more comprehensive agreement in 1989." The latter
agreement creates a management system for the permanent monitoring of
vegetative conditions and regulation of pumping rates to prevent changes in
plant communities. It creates a series of vegetative management zones, defined
according to their sensitivity to the impacts of groundwater pumping, and also
provides funding for numerous environmental control and mitigation
measures.
As in the Rocky Ford case, the litigation effort which created an incentive for
negotiations was costly and prolonged, but was necessary since California law
provides little opportunity for input by affected third parties in groundwater
10 Pratt, A Water Transfer Case Study of Third Party Impacts and Strategies, presented at the Water Marketing Conference,
University of Denver College of Law (1987).
11 County of Inyo and City of Los Angeles, Memorandum of Understanding, March 31, 1989 (regarding groundwater
pumping).
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cases. The public trust doctrine of the Mono Lake case has a forum for application
in the California Water Resources Control Board, authorized to condition the use
of surface water rights in accordance with numerous constraints, including that of
protecting the public trust. But there is no comparable forum to condition the
pumping of groundwater, the principal means by which Los Angeles withdraws
water from the Owens Valley.
NEVADA
In the Pyramid Lake case, years of litigation have recently resulted in move
ment toward a comprehensive negotiated solution. Here, I would like to isolate
in this complex situation the impact of Reno's water use and policies on the
Indian reservation lake. Through its recent growth, Reno has had to expand wa
ter treatment facilities and obtain EPA approval. This process created an opening
for the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe to deal with water quality impacts on fisheries
and the lake. Through recourse to this aspect of federal law, and in a context of
multi-party litigation based on federal water and reclamation law, the tribe has
been able to pressure Reno into an agreement that will alter internal city water
policies.12 Most notably, the agreement commits Reno to water conservation
measures, including metering, designed to assure minimal flows to the lake and
to protect water quality.
The agreement, with Reno's private water purveyor, would allow city water
supplies to be concentrated in Stampede Reservoir and would make storage space
available for tribal waters to protect fish spawning runs. It also would require
Reno to install water meters and formulate a water conservation plan.
Additionally, the agreement hinges on acquisition of agricultural water rights by
the federal government to protect Stillwater Wildlife Refuge and on a number of
other allocation decisions. But the greatest threat to this proposed agreement is
public opposition to water metering, something which has been banned by the
state legislature since 1919. In this case, the pressure created by an Indian commu
nity, protected under federal law, is causing a state to consider changing certain
urban water policies. The long term interest of the City of Reno is to stabilize the
legal situation in which it can acquire water rights. It thus has a powerful motive
to resolve the Indian-related disputes.
A common thread through these cases is the use of either federal or state laws
to create leverage for rural areas and for larger public interests (such as the protec
tion of Indian rights, of basins of origin, and of environmentally sensitive re
sources, water conservation and the role of local government in asserting state in
terests). They indicate the continuing confrontation between cities attempting to
acquire water supplies and the communities that are affected by their activities.
Many more could be cited.
12 Bureau of Indian Affairs, Tribal Newsletter, Vol. 15, No. 5, May, 1989, at 2.
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Albuquerque merits special mention because of the creative use it has made of
its present and temporary condition of surplus supply. In certain instances, rather
than waiting for litigation, it has helped achieve public interest goals even when
not required to do so. To accommodate the needs of recreational interests, for ex
ample, the city worked out an agreement with the State Engineer and the Bureau
of Reclamation to release waters from a reservoir on the Rio Chama, technically
for storage in a downstream reservoir, but actually to provide instream flows for
rafting purposes on a thirty mile stretch of the river. In another recent decision af
fecting local residents of this same area, the city provided a seasonal lease of water
to traditional acequia irrigators whose crops were imperiled because of low natu
ral flows in the Rio Chama downstream of the major storage reservoirs on that
river. These incidents suggest that cities can use their power to benefit rural and
public interests as well as to threaten them.
REDEFINING THE URBAN/RURAL/PUBLIC
RELATIONSHIP REGARDING WATER
Cities find themselves in a position of power with respect to rural communi
ties and to the protection of public interest values in major water bodies. The
large urban regions, whether represented by unitary water providers or by a mul
tiplicity of separate jurisdictions, have, by and large, responded, however reluc
tantly, to the needs and demands of the constituencies they impact but only under
the threat or actuality of legal action. State and federal law have given these con
stituencies enough recognition at least to enable them to litigate the cities into po
sitions where negotiated settlements are possible. Legislatures, increasingly ori
ented toward urban interests, have refused to pass measures that would give
sweeping powers to rural counties and others, but they have not given carte
blanche to the cities either.
The number and frequency of clashes between cities and the communities
they impact points to a struggle to define a new political relationship, one in
which the wide reach of urban water decisions goes hand in hand with a new
level of accountability. Increasingly, the question of whether Denver or Reno or
Phoenix residents reduce their per capita consumption has an impact on the abil
ity of farmers, ranchers, recreationists, environmentalists, Indian and Chicano
communities to continue to meet their water needs into the future. And cities
must take into account the rural and public interests in water if they are to be as
sured of security of supply. There is thus an interdependence but at the same time
an imbalance of power which is shifting more and more toward the cities as pop
ulation and the economic base of the Southwestern states continue to concentrate
in urban areas.
Whether or not new institutions can be created to help balance these interests
and provide a permanent forum in which water decisions reflecting the broadest
possible consideration of the complex public good can be made is a question that
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turns on the ability of diverse interests to work together. Unless there is a coali
tion of political force behind this concept, it will not come into existence. Thus
far, such a coalition has not emerged.
Recently, a number of agreements have been negotiated involving cities and
Indian tribes. The upshot of many of these is that the Indian water right is sharply
limited in exchange for other types of benefits. One might think that this could
provide a model for dealing with the urban need for water resources in other con
texts, that is, the cities will buy what they need. But a recent California proposal
suggests just the opposite, that a compelling public interest can buy out the city.
The California legislature has adopted a bill to protect Mono Lake by creating a
large fund to help Los Angeles replace water it may ultimately lose through court
action limiting its right to divert water from the streams feeding into Mono Lake.
The concept of the Cliff Dam replacement in Arizona has a similar logic to it. A
water project deemed undesirable for numerous reasons is to be replaced with a
fund to purchase water rights already being put to beneficial use. These proposals
go beyond opposition to the impacts of urban demand. They recognize that the
cities need water and must get it somewhere. If the public interest dictates that
one source cannot be sacrificed to meet that demand, then ways must be found to
provide compensatory supplies. That is the trade-off that proposals for institu
tional change must address.
In a larger context, the urbanizing areas can be seen as the major centers of
economic and technological change. As Lewis Mumford described them they pre
sent two different faces: the destructive one of the tentacular presence that reaches
out to control and seize for its own use resources of all types, and the positive one
of the invisible city that links diverse cultures and places and provides facilities
and resources that remote areas alone cannot support.13 When the huge
groundwater pumps or the massive dams and reservoirs of a city water provider
appear in a remote rural area—or the impact of those distant facilities lowers wa
ter tables or lake and river levels, those outward signs of urban influence suggest
a degree of resource need, of political and organizational power, of technology
and economic might that dwarf what has existed in most rural regions heretofore.
Their impact is similar to that of interstate highways. Roads, water facilities, ski
areas are all ways in which the urban-based economy draws rural areas—both its
traditional communities and its untouched lands—into its orbit, taking resources,
but also providing opportunities.
As the cases mentioned here demonstrate, the rural communities and the na
tional communities defending the natural environment are not without tools to
change and improve the policies of the urban areas. What is needed to ensure a
productive outcome to the clashes between these constituencies is both a sense of
the real interdependence that draws them together and the definition of policy
goals that transcend the narrow self-interest of any one constituency. The con-
13 L MUMFORD, THE CITY IN HISTORY: ITS ORIGINS, ITS TRANSFORMATIONS, AND ITS PROSPECTS 533 and 563 (1961).
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frontation of interests can proceed as one between predator and victim or it can be
restructured through new forums for decision making and policy development
into something approaching an alliance, in which cities invest in diverse ways in
rural areas in exchange for the withdrawal of water and other resources. To
achieve this, some type of regionalization of decision making seems inevitable.
At present we see mostly the ad hoc efforts to inject rural and environmental
values into decisions still controlled primarily by the powerful urban water.insti
tutions. Perhaps a regional approach will emerge in Arizona in the near future as
that state grapples with the impact of urban water farming. But such a change in
decision making will come only with considerable struggle as the rural and envi
ronmental communities devise strategies to keep themselves in the political and
legal arena where their rights and interests must be asserted. No concept for re
gional decision making will survive the political test unless there is a powerful
coalition pushing for its adoption. Creating such a coalition will have to be a ma
jor goal of all those communities faced with the water-related impacts of urban
growth.
